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OUR STORY BEGINS with a Republican president taking office
even though, pretty clearly, more Americans had voted against him than
had voted for him.
No, we are not talking about Donald Trump. (But since he does love
being talked about, we will talk about him soon enough.) And no, we are
not talking about George W. Bush in 2001, although he too will enter our
story, stage right, later on. Nor are we talking about Benjamin Harrison in
1889 or about Rutherford B. Hayes in 1877. Rather in this, the Inaugural
Abraham Lincoln Lecture on Constitutional Law, it is altogether fitting and
proper that we begin with the Inaugural of Abraham Lincoln himself on
March 4, 1861.
On that Inaugural Day everyone understood that Lincoln had won a
clear majority of duly cast and lawfully counted electoral votes, 180 out of
a total of 303. Everyone understood that Lincoln was thus undeniably
entitled to give his speech and take his oath and wield all presidential
power for the next four years under the Constitution. Yet participants and
onlookers that day also understood that the recent November election had
been an odd one. Lincoln’s democratic mandate, to use a modern term, was
shaky.
Running as a Republican against a fractured field—with Stephen
Douglas bearing the official standard of the Democratic Party, and John
Bell and John C. Breckinridge leading sizable splinter groups—Lincoln
had captured less than 40% of the national popular vote in November:
39.65% to be precise. Although this was a substantial plurality—Douglas
placed second, ten points behind—it was not exactly resounding. Most of
the voters who had supported Douglas, Bell, or Breckinridge did not view
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Lincoln as a close second choice. Most in fact were voting not just for their
man, but against Abe. Though no one can be sure today or could be sure
back then, it is quite possible that in a head-to-head competition between
Lincoln and Douglas—a clean rematch of the 1858 contest between these
two for the Illinois Senate seat—Douglas would have won more popular
votes nationwide.
Even if so, Lincoln’s Inaugural was poetic justice. Proverbially,
turnabout is fair play. And in at least two ways, Lincoln’s victory
counterbalanced earlier episodes in which the shoe had been on the other
foot.
First, in 1858 more Illinois voters had backed Lincoln’s fledging
Republican Party than Douglas’s Democrats. The Republicans that year
won roughly 50% of the statewide popular vote for state legislature,
compared to only 48% for the Democrats. But thanks to the usual electoral
imprecisions and idiosyncrasies (the sizes and the shapes of districts,
uneven ratios of voters to inhabitants in different places, varying victory
margins in diverse local contests, and so on), the Democrats managed to
win a majority of the legislative seats at stake that year—forty-six
compared to forty-one for the Republicans. Also, thirteen seats were not on
the ballot that round; and most of these holdover seats—eight to be
precise—were held by Dems. Thus, when the new Illinois General
Assembly convened after the election, Democrats controlled fifty-four of
the one hundred seats and naturally picked Douglas over Lincoln to
represent the state in the U.S. Senate. 1
Here, then, is the first turnabout and piece of poetic justice: In 1858
Lincoln lost even though he arguably won the popular vote; but in 1860
Lincoln won even though he arguably lost the popular vote.
Now for the second piece of political poetry: The Electoral College
had been intentionally engineered in 1787–88 and purposefully redesigned
in 1803–04 to bolster the slaveholding South, but in 1860–61 this elaborate
electoral contraption ended up working to the advantage of a northwestern
opponent of slavery.2 Lincoln was America’s first openly antislavery
president, and he became so precisely, if ironically, because of the
Electoral College system itself.
I shall soon say more about the slavocratic roots of the Founding
generation’s Electoral College; for now, let me simply show you that
Lincoln’s victory flowed from the basic structure of the system, and not
1

The facts and figures in this paragraph derive from the analysis offered by DON E.
FEHRENBACHER, PRELUDE TO GREATNESS: LINCOLN IN THE 1850’S 118–20 (1962).
2 I italicize and stress this final phrase for reasons I shall explain in my concluding section. See
infra text accompanying note 27.
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from any unique quirk created by the unusually crowded field. Even if
Lincoln had faced a single opponent, Douglas; and even if Douglas in this
hypothetical contest had also received every single vote that in fact went to
Bell or Breckinridge that year; and thus, even if Douglas had trounced
Lincoln in the national popular vote by a whopping margin of 60% to
40%—even then, Lincoln would have still won a clear electoral-vote
victory, 169 to 134. Lincoln received outright popular majorities—that is,
he beat the entire anti-Abe field—in every free state except New Jersey
(which he in fact split with Douglas) and the west coast jurisdictions of
Oregon and California (which he would have lost to Douglas in our
hypothetical).
In other words, thanks to the Electoral College system itself, which
allowed states to adopt state-winner-take-all rules in apportioning
electors—and thanks to the enormous population of the antislavery North
in 1860—the Founders’ proslavery Electoral College system was now
starting to tip decisively against slavery. This shift was occurring in part
because countless millions of voters had voted with their feet between 1787
and 1860—voted, that is, to remain in or move to vibrant free-soil states
rather than staying in or relocating to the backwards and oppressive states
of the slaveholding South.
In 1800, Thomas Jefferson had clearly bested John Adams in the
Electoral College, seventy-three to sixty-five. But roughly a dozen of
Jefferson’s seventy-three electoral votes existed only because the Electoral
College apportionment formula counted slaves (albeit at a discount—threefifths rather than five-fifths for free folk). Slaves of course did not vote and
were not protected by those who did. Without this electoral dirty dozen,
Monticello’s slave-master would have lost to the gentleman farmer from
Braintree by four electoral votes rather than winning by eight. Proverbially,
Jefferson had ridden into the Executive Mansion on the backs of his slaves.
And then, adding insult to injury, Jefferson’s allies worked to lock in slave
states’ unfair Electoral College advantage via a constitutional amendment
(the Twelfth Amendment, to be precise) adopted on his watch. Over the
ensuing decades, this Electoral College system operated time and again to
give Southern states extra electoral votes. 3 Grotesquely, the more slaves a
state held in bondage, the more votes that state got in the Electoral College.
But in 1860, finally—and poetically—this stinky Electoral College system
managed to advantage an antislavery candidate and his antislavery regional
coalition. Turnabout indeed.

3 For elaboration and defense of my mathematical and political-theory baselines in this analysis,
see AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 91–95 (2005).
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LET US NOW return to the claim I bracketed earlier—that the
Founders’ Electoral College system was studiously designed in 1787–88
and then knowingly revised in 1803–04 in a manner that gave slave states
the inside track. Let’s first dispense with the false just-so stories many of us
were fed in high school civics.
The Electoral College was not primarily designed to balance big states
against small states. True, this balance can be seen in the basic structure of
Congress and in today’s beautifully symmetric Capitol building: The House
favors populous states while the Senate counterbalances by giving each
state two seats regardless of population. But the deepest cleavages in postFounding American history have never run between big and small states.
The big states have typically not acted as a bloc. (Today, California, Texas,
Florida, and New York rarely vote together.) Ditto for small states. (Rhode
Island is northeastern and urban whereas Wyoming and Montana are
anything but. Alaska is a land of totem poles and tundra; Delaware, of tolls
and turnpikes.) The main divisions in America are today and since the
Founding have always been between North and South, between coasts and
the interior, and between cities and backcountry.
More to the point, if the Framers designed the Electoral College to
boost small states, they did an astonishingly poor job of it. Virginia started
out as the most populous state in the Union, and in the first nine
presidential elections Virginians won eight times, with four different twotermers (George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and
James Monroe). The only non-Virginian victor between 1788 and 1823 was
another big-state candidate—John Adams from Massachusetts, whose bigstate son, John Quincy Adams, would later succeed Monroe. All the early
runners-up were also big-state men. Early tickets balanced Northerners and
Southerners, not big-state and small-state partners. In all of American
history, only three men have won the presidency from small states: Zachary
Taylor, Franklin Pierce, and Bill Clinton. 4
In short, the Philadelphia Framers’ Electoral College was
emphatically not about giving small-state men a leg up. After the first four
presidential races, the big-state biases of the system were on full display for
all to see, and in response Americans proceeded to amend the Electoral
College system to strengthen the big-state advantage. Enacted in 1803–04,
the Twelfth Amendment aimed to facilitate an emerging two-party system
in which each party would openly run an executive ticket, with one
candidate slated for the presidency and the other for the vice presidency.
4
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This two-party system would in most instances generate a winner on
Election Day, thereby giving the edge to big states with winner-take-all
rules. (By contrast, had no strong two-party system emerged, Election Day
votes might have scattered more widely; fewer candidates might have won
outright electoral-vote majorities on Election Day; and more races might
have been thrown into Congress under rules giving each state, however
small, an equal vote in picking the winner.)
If the Electoral College system was not designed and redesigned to
boost small states (and it was not) neither was it crafted and revised to
enable wise philosopher-king “electors” to substitute their superior wisdom
for the ignorant preferences of the unwashed masses. Electors were obliged
to meet on a single day, with no real time for genuine deliberation. 5 Many
of the best political minds within each state—its federal representatives and
senators—were constitutionally precluded from serving as electors. 6 From
the first election in 1788 to the present day, most electors have simply
carried out the will of those who chose them. As a rule, electors have been
potted plants, nobodies from nowhere, instructed or even pledged to vote
for a particular candidate.
If you doubt this, I have a simple challenge for you. Surely you could
name, if given a minute to collect your thoughts, three notable presidents in
American history; or three governors; or three senators; or three cabinet
members; or three justices; or even three notable House members, living or
dead. But even if given an hour or a day or a week or a month or a year
(sans Internet or library access), could you name three notable presidential
electors, dead or alive?
Contrary to some high-school civics textbooks, the Framers did not
generally despise or disdain democracy—either the word or the thing itself.
According to a leading Framer, James Wilson—the man responsible for the
Constitution’s opening three words and one of the document’s most
influential defenders during the great ratification debate of 1787–88—the
Constitution was “purely democratical” and “the DEMOCRATIC principle
is carried into every part of the government.” 7
In 1787–88, the Constitution itself was put to a series of votes of
unprecedented democratic inclusivity up and down the continent. In these

5

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3–4.
Id. cl. 2.
7 AMAR, supra note 3, at 16–17; The Debates in the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania on the
Adoption of the Federal Constitution, in 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT
PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787 434, 482, 523 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott Co., 2d ed.
1891).
6
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epic elections, ordinary property qualifications were lowered or waived
altogether in eight states (and nowhere were they raised); in this epic year,
more persons were allowed to vote than had ever been allowed to vote on
any previous measure in human history. 8 (Before this year, only two states,
Massachusetts and New Hampshire, had ever put proposed constitutions to
a popular vote.) The new federal Constitution prominently provided for
direct election of House members—a dramatic and undeniably democratic
break with the Articles of Confederation. In sharp contrast to almost all
contemporaneous state constitutions, the federal Constitution eschewed
property qualifications for public servants, and even promised that federal
lawmakers would be paid for their time, thus making it easier for middling
men of modest means to serve in government. In yet another great
democratic leap forward compared to state constitutions, the new
Constitution opened federal service to all religious sects. Plus, anyone
eligible to vote for his state assembly was likewise eligible to vote for his
federal representative; and unlike the great majority of state constitutions,
the federal document committed itself to a regular census and
reapportionment process. 9 Most important for our purposes, the new federal
8

AMAR, supra note 3, at 5–7, 503–05 nn.1–2.
For much more on the broadly democratic nature of the federal Constitution compared to the
Articles of Confederation and contemporaneous state constitutions, see id. passim. My claims in this
book stand opposed to central themes of an important but flawed new book, MICHAEL J. KLARMAN,
THE FRAMERS’ COUP: THE MAKING OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (2016). In one passage that
sums up much of the attitude and affect of his book, Klarman says the following: “Only a ratifying
process that was less participatory than the governance norms employed in many states could have
secured endorsement of a constitution that was less democratic in its substance than were all state
constitutions of the era.” Id. at 618. This is wrong on virtually every count. The Constitution’s popular
ratification process was far more inclusive than that of almost every state’s popular ratification process
(nonexistent in most states); and also more inclusive than the ordinary state election process, which
typically featured higher property qualifications. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. As for the
day-to-day substance of federal norms, the federal Constitution’s rejection of property rules for public
service, its commitment to a regular census and reapportionment, its generous suffrage rules, its ban on
religious tests, its promises of federal salaries to lawmakers, its antidynastic age rules, and much more
made it on balance more democratic than most state counterparts. Also, the document of course created
a directly elected House of Representatives that was surely more democratic than the old Congress
under the Confederation. Klarman’s complaints are based on a slew of analytically undefended claims
and dubious implicit assumptions—for example, that annual elections are always better, democratically,
than biannual ones (really? and on this logic would monthly elections be better still?); that binding
instruction of legislators is a democratic virtue (it isn’t); that term limits are likewise a democratic leap
forward (not necessarily—and they do limit voters’ choices on election day); and that a robust executive
is intrinsically undemocratic (wrong again). It bears noting (as my work in fact notes, and Klarman’s
does not) that over the course of American history, beginning as early as 1790, many state constitutions
have migrated toward the federal model on many of these issues—electoral timing, instruction,
executive power, and so on—and that states have done so in genuinely democratic fashion. And on the
issue of term limits and legislative rotation, only one state constitution on the books in 1787
(Pennsylvania’s) limited legislative re-eligibility. Serious readers should treat Klarman’s sweeping
claims about democracy with skepticism and should compare his account to the detailed analysis
9
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Constitution allowed states to let ordinary voters pick pledged or instructed
presidential electors. Leading Founders in the ratification process proudly
predicted that states would in fact opt for popular election, and many states
did so from the beginning. 10
Even more important, the Twelfth Amendment was designed precisely
to encourage popular elections in the several states, by facilitating a
fledgling two-party system that would predictably mobilize ordinary
citizens and give them the necessary information about the major
presidential candidates. In the first election after the Amendment’s
ratification, roughly two-thirds of the states allowed voters to pick electors
directly. By 1828, voters were directly choosing electors in twenty-one of
the twenty-four states.11 By then, the party that Jefferson had founded had
become the dominant political party in America, a party that would
generally enjoy a substantial edge in congressional and presidential
contests until Lincoln came along in 1860. That party proudly called itself
the Democratic party—a moniker that would have made no sense were the
word “democracy” a Founding Era bugaboo, as so many have been
erroneously taught by mistaken high school teachers and misleading high
school textbooks.
So if the Electoral College was designed neither to upgrade small
states nor to displace democracy, what was its Founding Era raison d’être?
Not to boost small states, but to bolster slave states. At the Philadelphia
Convention, the visionary Pennsylvanian James Wilson proposed direct
national election of the president. But in a key speech on July 19, 1787,
Virginia’s James Madison threw cold water on this proposal: “The right of
suffrage was much more diffusive in the Northern than the Southern States;
contained in AMAR, supra note 3—a work that Klarman oddly fails to engage. For example, Klarman
emphasizes at some length that many Antifederalists deemed the House of Representatives too small,
but he races too quickly past the key fact that, in response to this compelling criticism, the issue of
congressional size was in effect democratically renegotiated during the ratification process, with
Federalists promising a dramatically larger House as soon as a census could be done and then keeping
their promise. Compare KLARMAN, supra, at 172–73, 355–61, with AMAR, supra note 3, at 76–82.
More generally, Klarman spends too much time on the secret drafting process and not enough time on
the wide-open ratification process, which was far more democratic than he admits, in both the breadth
of eligible participation and the scope of democratic deliberation and subtle renegotiation of the
Philadelphia plan. Nor does Klarman have a satisfying answer to the following objection: If the
Constitution was as undemocratic as he claims, why did Americans not merely vote for it in the great
(and democratically inclusive) national ratification contest of 1787–88, but then continue to vote
immediately (and repeatedly thereafter) for the men who had famously drafted and backed the
document—George Washington, James Madison, and many others? Klarman’s own evidence shows
that criticism “quickly dissipated” and “rapid[ly] decline[d]” and did so in various places even before
the document went into effect. Cf. KLARMAN, supra, at 619–20.
10 AMAR, supra note 3, at 152–55, 342.
11 Id. at 342.
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and the latter could have no influence in the election on the score of
Negroes.”12 In other words, a direct election system would be a dealbreaker for the South, which would get no credit for its half million slaves,
who of course could not vote. But the Electoral College—a prototype of
which Madison proposed in this same speech—would eventually enable
each Southern state to count its slaves, albeit with a two-fifths discount, in
computing its share of the overall number of presidential electors.
As the Electoral College system unfolded in early America, Madison’s
Virginia—a big state with a big slave population—unsurprisingly emerged
as the big winner of the scheme that Madison himself had sketched out in
his key speech. Prior to the first census, the Old Dominion would command
twelve out of a total of ninety-one electoral votes allocated by the
Philadelphia Constitution, more than a quarter of the forty-six needed to
win.13 Under the 1800 census, although Virginia had ten percent fewer free
persons than Pennsylvania, Madison’s homeland received twenty percent
more electoral votes thanks to its many slaves. 14 Perversely, the more slaves
Virginia (or any other slave state) bought or bred the more electoral votes it
would receive. Were a slave state to free any blacks who then moved north,
the state could actually lose electoral votes.
After Washington’s resignation in 1796, America witnessed its first
two genuinely contested presidential elections. Unsurprisingly, these
elections pitted a Southerner (Jefferson) against a Northerner (Adams).
Unsurprisingly, each region generally backed its favorite son both times.
The key swing state was thus New York, which was at that time a middle
jurisdiction where North met South—a slave state with a nontrivial number
of slaves, but a state that was in the process of gradually eliminating
slavery. (To put my point a different way: Note that these elections did not
pit big states on one side against small states on the other. In these
presidential elections as in so many others, including the one that brought
Lincoln to office, the electoral fault lines were latitude lines.)
When the Twelfth Amendment tinkered with rather than tossing the
Electoral College system in the aftermath of Jefferson’s 1800 triumph, the
system’s proslavery bias was visible to all—an open and festering wound
in the American body politic. In the floor debate over the Amendment in
late 1803, Massachusetts Congressman Samuel Thatcher complained that
“[t]he representation of slaves adds thirteen members to this House in the
present Congress, and eighteen Electors of President and Vice President at
12 Id. at 156–57; 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 56–57 (Max Farrand
ed., 1966).
13 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
14 AMAR, supra note 3, at 158.

70

112:63 (2017)

Electoral College Reform

the next election.” 15 But Thatcher’s complaint went unredressed. As they
had at Philadelphia, Northerners caved to Southerners by refusing to insist
on direct national election.
The Electoral College system that remains in place to this day is thus
not the Electoral College 1.0 that emerged from Philadelphia, but rather the
Electoral College 2.0, aka the Twelfth Amendment, knowingly designed to
facilitate popular participation, and a two-party system, and presidential
tickets—and slavery. This Amendment was drafted by and for Thomas
Jefferson’s and James Madison’s proslavery party, in the wake of an
election that had made clear to anyone with eyeballs that extra slaves meant
extra Electoral College clout. Yet the Amendment typically—shockingly—
goes unmentioned in standard civics accounts of America’s Electoral
College system.
Also unmentioned in most standard civics books is the remarkable fact
that until Lincoln’s election, every single president was either a Southerner
or a Northern man of Southern sympathies. By this I mean that no
president, as president, ever said, prior to Lincoln’s Inaugural, that slavery
was wrong and should eventually be abolished. True, Washington nobly
provided for the freeing of his slaves in his will; but he did so as a purely
private citizen who had long since retired from public life. And
manumission of individual slaves, however admirable, is not the same
thing as ending slavery as a system, everywhere and forever. True, John
Adams was not himself a strong slavocrat, but he did choose South
Carolina slavocrats, Thomas Pinckney and Charles Cotesworth Pinckney,
as his running mates in 1796 and 1800. And Adams chose these mates
because of the obvious need to offer a balanced ticket that took account of
Southern electoral votes—electoral votes that were, to repeat, artificially
inflated by the three-fifths compromise baked into the Electoral College.
True, John Quincy Adams was “Old Man Eloquent” against slavery at the
end of his life—but that was when he was a mere congressman from
Massachusetts who no longer needed to woo Southern electors. As
president, he did need to worry about the South, and his vice president was
yet another South Carolinian, John C. Calhoun.
In short, the three-fifths compromise at the wormy, rotten core of the
antebellum Electoral College had real and ignoble consequences for the
antebellum American presidency. Time and again vicious and viciously
proslavery folk served as presidents, vice presidents, and cabinet officers—
Franklin Pierce, James Buchanan, John C. Breckinridge, and John C.
Calhoun, to name just a few of the most obvious members of this historical
15

13 ANNALS OF CONG. 538 (1803).
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Hall of Shame. Not only did no president, as president, call for slavery’s
ultimate extinction prior to March 4, 1861—even a slow extinction with
full compensation to slave masters—but also no cabinet officer prior to
Lincoln’s administration ever did so. 16 And so March 4, 1861, the Inaugural
of Abraham Lincoln, was truly a day for us all to remember, and not just
because today marks the Inaugural Abraham Lincoln Lecture.
I WAS NOT TAUGHT about the proslavery tilt of the antebellum
Electoral College in high school; almost no one in my generation was. Nor
was I taught the truth in college or in law school. But as a fledgling law
professor in the 1990s I began to study the historical and structural
connections between America’s rather peculiar Electoral College system
and America’s other infamously peculiar institution.
Enter, stage right, George W. Bush and the election of 2000. For the
first time in over a century, a man who clearly lost the national popular
vote—and Bush lost it to Al Gore by an undeniable margin, half a million
votes—managed to eke out an Electoral College majority. This odd turn of
events provided an opportunity for me to share with my fellow citizens the
real truth about the origins of the Electoral College. Shortly after the
election, I published an op-ed in The New York Times highlighting the
original Electoral College’s proslavery roots and drawing particular
attention to slavery’s role in the 1800 election. 17
This op-ed ended with a call for a constitutional amendment to
vindicate James Wilson at long last by providing for direct national
presidential election. But it is not easy to amend the Constitution, and as
time passed, I began to wonder whether there might be better pathways for
modern reformers. Might there be informal non-amendment workarounds
and adaptations that could approximate direct presidential election while
formally operating within the existing constitutional framework? In
particular, might the history of U.S. Senate elections provide possible
models for emulation?
Recall that at the Founding, state legislatures chose U.S. senators
pursuant to the clear rules of Article I. The Seventeenth Amendment,
proposed in 1912 and ratified the following year, formally changed these
Article I rules, mandating the modern system of direct popular election of
senators.
16 DON E. FEHRENBACHER, CONSTITUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE SLAVEHOLDING
SOUTH 54 (1989).
17 Akhil Reed Amar, The Electoral College: Unfair from Day One, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2000),
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/09/opinion/the-electoral-college-unfair-from-day-one.html
[https://perma.cc/KZR4-KVS3].
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But long before the 1910s, Americans had begun to move informally
toward direct senatorial elections, via informal, non-amendment
workarounds and adaptations. By 1912 most senators were already or were
about to become, de facto, directly elected, and most state legislatures were
already or were in the process of becoming rubber stamps. On reflection,
this makes sense. Why would the great mass of senators who voted to
propose the Seventeenth Amendment change the basic ground rules that
got them elected? In fact, they wouldn’t and didn’t: Many were already
being directly elected in one way or another. Why would the lion’s share of
state legislatures who opted to ratify the Amendment vote to disempower
themselves? Once again, they wouldn’t and didn’t: Their power to pick
senators had already drained away in many places.
To understand how all this started, we must return to Abraham
Lincoln. But this time, not to the election when he bested Douglas, but
rather to the election when Douglas bested him.
Sometimes, one part of our brain does not talk to another part of our
brain, and so it is with the Lincoln–Douglas debates. One part of our highschool-civics brain knows that Lincoln and Douglas were running for the
U.S. Senate, and seeking to woo ordinary voters. But another part of our
high-school-civics brain knows that senators in that era were not directly
elected. So what exactly was happening in 1858?
What was happening was that Illinois was improvising a new way of
moving toward direct senatorial elections, de facto. In an unprecedented
maneuver, each of the two political parties in Illinois decided to announce
before the 1858 state legislative election the man whom the party would
name to the U.S. Senate after the election if the party controlled the next
session of the General Assembly. These paired announcements had the
effect of turning the 1858 state legislative election into a referendum of
sorts on the U.S. Senate race. If a voter liked Douglas, that voter should
cast a ballot for the local Democrat. If the voter instead preferred Lincoln,
he should vote to send a Republican to Springfield. 18
This improvisation was, as we have seen, imperfect. More voters
likely backed Lincoln; but the popular vote was close and Douglas ended
up winning the prize. Moreover, some voters may have cared more about
local issues and local political personalities. That is, they may have
preferred Lincoln over Douglas (or vice versa) while also preferring the
local Democrat (or Republican) for General Assembly, for any number of
reasons.

18

AMAR, supra note 3, at 410–11; FEHRENBACHER, supra note 16, at 48–49.
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However imperfect this early improvisation may have been, the
memory and legend of the 1858 Lincoln–Douglas Senate race lived on, and
may well have inspired the next generation of reformers to craft the next
generation of improvisations and workarounds to approximate the direct
election of senators.
Some improvisations operated with strong assistance from state
political parties—much as both Illinois parties in 1858 had acted, in their
timing of nominations, so to as to turn the state legislative election into a de
facto federal senatorial contest. In the late nineteenth century, states began
to experiment with direct primary elections for Senate candidates within
each party.19 This system narrowed the U.S. Senate contest in the state
legislature to two champions, each boasting popular support within his
party. But this system could not ensure that the legislature would in fact
crown the man whom most voters would have preferred in a head-to-head
race between the top Democrat and the top Republican—a race that could
not easily be accommodated within the partisan-primary-election
framework. Nevertheless, the Senate-primary system, operational in
twenty-eight of the forty-six states in 1910, did enhance the democratic
character of the federal upper chamber and proved especially significant in
the South and other places where one party was dominant and the primary
election was thus the main event.
At the turn of the century, Oregon began to experiment with a
different approach, which went through several iterations and refinements
both in Oregon itself and in copycat states such as Nebraska, Oklahoma,
Montana, and Nevada. Under the Oregon Plan, the state at its general
election allowed voters to directly express their preferences among the
candidates for the United States Senate. In an early version of the plan,
individual state lawmakers could, if they chose, officially pledge to support
the winner of the voters’ preference-poll. Once this pledge was taken, even
a Republican state legislator would be honor-bound to vote for a given
Democratic senatorial candidate if that Democrat were to win the
preference-poll (and so too a pledged Democratic state legislator would be
honor-bound if a Republican won the preference-poll). In a later version,
Oregon voters in 1908 enacted a state initiative purporting to “instruct” the
state legislature to ratify the people’s choice.
By early 1913, more than half the states had already committed
themselves to a form of direct election—either the direct-primary approach
in one-party states or some version of the Oregon Plan. Thus, when

19 My language and analysis here and in the next paragraph borrow heavily from AMAR, supra note
3, at 410–13.
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senators and state legislatures from these states supported the Seventeenth
Amendment, they were voting to constitutionalize rules that were already
largely in place or about to be in place.
WHAT, YOU MAY ASK, does any of this pre-Seventeenth
Amendment history—even if it is interesting in its own right, and even if it
directly traces back to Abraham Lincoln’s first great moment in the
national spotlight—have to do with modern-day Electoral College reform?
Here’s what. In the year after the wild election of 2000, I began to
ponder the pre-1912 improvisations to Article I that had informally created
direct senatorial elections. Might there be similar improvisations, I mused,
that could today be made to Article II and the Twelfth Amendment,
improvisations that might lead to informal direct presidential elections?
And just as informal systems of direct senatorial election eventually laid
the groundwork for a formal constitutional amendment codifying direct
election, might the same pattern repeat itself for direct presidential
elections, with informal adaptations eventually paving the way for a formal
amendment at some later point?
In December 2001, on the first anniversary of Bush v. Gore, I unveiled
on a quiet, law-centric website two possible improvisations that would
formally preserve the current Electoral College system while
approximating, de facto, direct national election. 20 One improvisation
involved coordinated action among the states. I suggested that a group of
states—states with at least 270 electoral votes among them, enough votes
to carry the day in the Electoral College—could enact laws providing that
each of these state’s electoral votes would go to the candidate who won the
national popular vote, rather than the popular vote within the state. In this
scenario, whoever won the national popular vote would get all the electoral
votes from all these coordinating states—at least 270, which would
guarantee that the national popular vote winner would also have an
Electoral College majority.
Quite independently and doubtless more importantly, Northwestern
Law’s former Dean, Robert W. Bennett, was floating a similar thought
experiment in a pair of essays that reached a wide audience in a smart and

20 Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, How to Achieve Direct National Election of the
President
Without
Amending
the
Constitution,
FINDLAW
(Dec.
28,
2001),
http://supreme.findlaw.com/legal-commentary/how-to-achieve-direct-national-election-of-thepresident-without-amending-the-constitution.html [https://perma.cc/E2P6-GTRU], reprinted in AKHIL
REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION TODAY: TIMELESS LESSONS FOR THE ISSUES OF OUR ERA 351–57
(2016).
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stylish legal journal, The Green Bag.21 Dean Bennett’s plan and mine
diverged in certain respects, but both plans envisioned a series of
interlocking state laws. No state would need to unilaterally disarm,
electorally. Each state would abandon its current state-winner-take-all
system of electoral-vote allocation only if enough other states followed
suit.
Much to my surprise, this idea has begun to gain traction in, as they
say, “the real world”—a world sharply distinct from the world that unfolds
merely inside an academic’s brain. As of today, a National Popular Vote
Interstate Compact (NPVIC) plan following the broad outlines of Dean
Bennett’s essays and my 2001 musings has been formally adopted by ten
state legislatures and the District of Columbia. Together, this group
comprises 165 electoral votes, more than 60% of the 270 electoral votes
needed for the plan to go into operation.
But there are real problems with this plan, wrinkles that have not been
completely ironed out. Several of these problems were highlighted in my
2001 essay, and several others have surfaced in my more recent musings on
the matter. What if states outside the coordinating group seek to sabotage
the plan by refusing to hold proper recounts in the event that the national
popular vote margin is razor thin? Can individual state election officials
confidently certify a national popular vote winner given that they have very
little control over, or even knowledge about, the electoral apparatus of
other states? In a world in which the entire game becomes winning a
national vote, might some states seek to increase their overall clout by
reckless expansions of the franchise? (Suppose California seeks to loom
larger in the overall count by letting sixteen-year-olds vote; and New York
ups the ante by lowering the voting age to fourteen?)
To avoid chaos and catastrophic confusion, the uniform and
interlocking state laws enacted under the NPVIC will need to be
supplemented by a comprehensive congressional statute providing detailed
federal oversight of the presidential election process in all states—not
merely the states that enact the NPVIC law. Such a statute could be rooted
in Congress’s power to pass all laws “necessary and proper” to vindicate
Congress’s role in overseeing interstate compacts under Article I, Section
10, and also in Congress’s power to regulate the “Manner” of congressional
elections under Article I, Section 4. (One part of a standardized ballot that
Congress could lawfully mandate for House and Senate elections could
include a standardized section for each voter to register her presidential
21 Robert W. Bennett, Popular Election of the President Without a Constitutional Amendment,
4 GREEN BAG 2D 241 (2001); Robert W. Bennett, State Coordination in Popular Election of the
President Without a Constitutional Amendment, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 141 (2002).
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preference; and this standardized section could be monitored and
administered by federal election officials working alongside their state
election-law counterparts.)22 But enactment of this comprehensive
congressional law would require careful lawyering and broad political
consensus. We should not underestimate the difficulties that flank this
pathway.
Let us turn our attention, then, to a second possible reform pathway—
the second thought experiment I tossed out in late 2001, mapping an
altogether different and entirely distinct way of informally achieving direct
national election while formally preserving the current Electoral College.
This way is laughably simple. It does not require new laws in a host of
states or a new and elaborate congressional statute. In principle, this
alternative approach requires faithful buy-in from only four persons (!)
each presidential election cycle, backed by a broad but informal normative
consensus that these four are acting honorably and properly. As I look
forward to the presidential election of 2020 and beyond, this second
pathway seems perhaps more promising than the NPVIC. It is also more
distinctly Lincolnian, in certain respects.
Recall that in 1858, the state-legislative election was turned into a
federal-senatorial referendum of sorts not by formal laws, but by political
operatives—by the political parties, who promised to back Lincoln and
Douglas, and by these two men themselves who promised to publicly
debate each other under agreed-upon ground rules. This system worked not
via complicated state or federal laws, but via parties, persons, and
promises, backed by considerations of honor and reputation. The next
major round of Senate reforms also traveled through political parties,
political persons, and political promises. State parties ran primaries and
state lawmakers personally pledged to honor their parties’ popular picks.
Early versions of the Oregon Plan likewise operated less through law and
more through personal pledges and personal promises that the people’s
Election Day verdict, howsoever informal and technically nonbinding,
would be obeyed.
Here, then, is the second informal pathway to direct presidential
election in 2020 and beyond: In any future presidential election, the two
presidential candidates, backed by their respective running mates, can
solemnly pledge to each other and to us all, on television and Twitter, that
they will abide by the national popular vote. And once this happens in one
particular presidential election cycle, there may develop strong pressure for
22 For more detailed thoughts, see Vikram David Amar, Response, The Case for Reforming
Presidential Elections by Sub-Constitutional Means: The Electoral College, the National Popular Vote
Compact and Congressional Power, 100 GEO. L.J. 237 (2011).
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candidates in future presidential elections to follow suit. Thus are born
quasi-constitutional customs and constitutional conventions. (Think for
example of how a strong if admittedly informal and somewhat imprecise
norm developed early on that presidents would not serve more than two
terms—a norm followed, more or less, for a long period of time and then
eventually codified in the Twenty-Second Amendment in 1951.)23
The candidates themselves can make their pledges to abide by the
national popular vote stick via the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, which allows
a president to fill a vacant vice presidency. 24 Suppose for example that
Smith somehow is inaugurated even though Jones won the national popular
vote. On Inauguration Day, Smith’s vice-presidential running mate would
resign immediately. Smith would then name Jones the new vice president
under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, and upon Jones’s pro-forma
confirmation by Congress—he is, after all, the man with the mandate in our
hypothetical—Smith would step down in favor of Jones. (Though this
scenario might seem odd, it is not so different from the one that made
Gerald Ford president in 1974: Vice President Spiro Agnew resigned, and
then was replaced by Ford, who in turn became president upon Richard
Nixon’s resignation.)
WHICH BRINGS US, FINALLY, to President Trump. He believes in
making deals. Would he be willing to make this one, solemnly and
publicly, in the summer of 2020? But, you ask, even if he did shake hands
with, say, Democratic presidential nominee Tim Kaine, how is the deal to
be enforced? Suppose, for example that Trump and Kaine make the deal,
with the entire nation and world watching; and suppose further that 2020
ends up as a virtual repeat of 2016, with Trump losing the popular vote by
a healthy margin but nevertheless winning the same states he won in 2016,
with a collective Electoral College count of about 300—far above the allimportant 270. In such a scenario, what would stop him from reneging?
We all would. His party would. His running mate would. His own
electors would. Or at least we and they all would if the popular vote was
indeed clear. If not, Trump might get the benefit of the doubt, because the
key decisionmakers would be his own political allies. In this 2020 world
that I am asking you to envision, it would still be an important formal
advantage to win a formal state-by-state Electoral College majority; such a
majority would enable Trump’s own backers to be the umpires of who

23 For more on the two-term convention and its interesting history, see AMAR, supra note 3, at
433–38.
24 This paragraph borrows directly and liberally from AMAR, supra note 20, at 356.
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really won the popular vote. Rather than being a defect of my proposed
improvisation, this fact is arguably a virtue: This feature of the system
would give both candidates a reason to pay attention to both the informal
popular vote and to the formal electoral-vote map. The formal electoral
map would be a tiebreaker if doubt truly exists about who won the informal
national popular vote.
Here’s how the system would unfold. Suppose Trump claimed that he
really did win the popular vote after all, and that the mainstream media’s
tallies (backed in many instances by formal totals from state election
officials) are all fake or fraudulent. Would his running mate, Mike Pence,
back this claim? After all, in our imagined 2020 hypothetical Pence, too,
was part of the summer handshake agreement. Thus on the day after the
election and every day thereafter he would be pressed (by the press) at
every turn to clarify his own position on the matter. Would the Cabinet
back Trump, or would members feel the need to resign as a matter of
personal reputation and personal honor? Would congressional Republicans
back Trump? If not, a portion of them could combine with (presumably
united) congressional Democrats to impeach and remove Trump for the
high misconduct of lying to the American people on a matter of the gravest
moment. Which is as it should be: No president should be ousted from
office unless major blocs of his own party and his own electoral coalition
deem him unworthy.
Most immediately, would all of Trump’s handpicked electors back
Trump? Ordinarily, these obscure men and women are indeed potted plants
and should not think that they have any proper mandate to violate their own
explicit and implicit promises to the voters to back the candidate whom the
voters did in fact vote for. But in certain unusual situations when
momentous new developments arise after Election Day, constitutionally
conscientious electors do have a key role to play, and the fact that these
electors are formal actors in the system becomes a useful feature rather
than an unfortunate bug.
Suppose a presidential candidate suffers a debilitating stroke hours
after Election Day. In this scenario, sensible electors must act not as
instructed agents but as independent actors. They must improvise, and act
as the voters who picked them would themselves wish to act given the new
facts. Presumably many Trump voters in our 2020 hypothetical are voting
for him because they consider him a man of his word, and would not have
voted for him if they believed otherwise. If Trump’s post-Election Day
behavior disproves this basic assumption about Trump, a conscientious
Trump elector could indeed properly vote for Kaine in our hypothetical—
where Kaine clearly won the popular vote, and Trump had clearly
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promised to abide by that popular vote and then clearly reneged. Even so,
many Trump electors might still opt to stand by their man. Perhaps these
electors are post-Truth cynics, or true believers in Trump no matter what
the facts might be. But in our hypothetical, Kaine would not need most
Trump electors to cross over; a small minority—a mere 10% or so of
Trump’s electors—might suffice to give Kaine the needed 270 electoral
votes. But once again, it is key to note that these crossovers would be
members of Trump’s own party, his own coalition—in keeping with earlier
pre-Seventeenth Amendment reforms that achieved informal direct election
of senators thanks to a combination of parties, persons, and promises.
IT MIGHT SEEM utterly naïve and ridiculously optimistic to place
such heavy reliance on things like truth, facts, good faith, and political
honor. But as this lecture now draws to close I ask you to join me in my
naiveté and optimism. On March 4, 1861, slavery was a deeply entrenched
feature of American life and America’s Constitution. And yet Abraham
Lincoln envisioned a time when the nation would no longer exist half slave
and half free. In the long run, Lincoln believed that “the better angels of
our nature” would prevail, and on the slavery issue at least, he was right. 25
Lincoln always opposed slavery. He once said, “if slavery is not
wrong, nothing is wrong. I cannot remember when I did not so think, and
feel.”26 But even though his moral clarity on slavery came from a very deep
place, early in life, it surely did not hurt that he came of political age in the
Old Northwest—the territory from which this great University takes its
name. You will all recall of course that the Northwest Ordinance of 1787
banned slavery in this territory. And it did so in language that would
eventually find its way, word for word, into the Thirteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution—an Amendment strongly backed by
Lincoln himself and an Amendment that he in fact signed, although strictly
speaking his signature was legally unnecessary. 27
Many of the issues that now confront us lack the blinding moral
clarity of the slavery question in Lincoln’s day. I freely confess that
Electoral College reform—my topic today—is hardly black and white.
True, the Electoral College system has tainted roots, but today the system

25 Abraham
Lincoln,
First
Inaugural
Address
(Mar.
4,
1861),
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/lincoln1.asp [https://perma.cc/KL3Q-RBP8].
26 Letter from President Abraham Lincoln to Albert G. Hodges, Editor of the Frankfort
Commonwealth
(Apr.
4,
1864),
https://memory.loc.gov/ammem/alhtml/almss/ln001.html
[https://perma.cc/65G5-QWCY].
27 On the link between the ordinance and the Amendment, see AMAR, supra note 3, at 359. On
Lincoln’s signature, see id. at 594–95 n.7.
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can be justified on grounds entirely unconnected to slavery. Simple inertia
is perhaps the best argument. The modern version of the Electoral College
is the devil we know; even well-intentioned reform might have unforeseen
and unfortunate consequences. Some reforms might create more problems
than they would solve. And here is another thing to be said for the Electoral
College system: For all its flaws, it did give us President Abraham Lincoln.
So whatever side you fall on—reform or no reform; formal
amendment, informal improvisation, or the known knowns of the status
quo—please remember that there are persons of intelligence and good faith
on a different side. To quote a great man one last time. “We are not
enemies, but friends. We must not be enemies. Though passion may have
strained, it must not break our bonds of affection.” 28

28

Lincoln, supra note 25.
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